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In April 2016, India took a momentous step forward in its quest to com-
plete the nuclear triad.1 INS Arihant—India’s first indigenously-built, nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)—launched its long-range nuclear-
capable missile, codenamed the K-4, for the first time while submerged. Unveiled
in 2009 for several years of trials, Arihant is the first of a planned five- or six-ship
SSBN fleet to be introduced over the next half-century that will provide India
with a secure and assured second-strike capability,2 or the ability for a country
to respond to a nuclear attack with its own nuclear counterstrike. While Arihant
herself was conspicuously absent from February 2016’s International Fleet
Review at Vishakapatnam, the presence of a Russian submarine rescue vessel at
the event suggested that India had other tasks for its newest boat. Several weeks
later, officials confirmed that the submarine had completed deep-sea diving
drills and weapons launch tests, and that “the submarine can now be commis-
sioned at any time.”3
The coming induction of INSArihant into the IndianNavy’s fleet presages a new
era in South Asia that echoes the Cold War, when U.S. and Soviet submarines
played high-stakes games of cat-and-mouse with one another. Naval nuclear reac-
tors, first introduced to theU.S. submarine fleet in 1955 and to the Soviet fleet three
years later, gave submarines the ability to stay fully submerged—and thus largely
undetectable—for several months at a time while offering superior speed and a
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truly global reach. Fast attack nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) could be config-
ured for a range of missions, primarily anti-submarine warfare (ASW); anti-surface
warfare (ASuW); and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). Mean-
while, fleets of SSBNs offered the assurance of a second strike in the event of nuclear
attack. That secure second-strike capabilitywas thought to cementmutually assured
destruction, thus stabilizing the U.S.–Soviet deterrent relationship.4
By the end of the Cold War, the idea that ballistic missile submarines provided a
critical deterrent function had remained intact since its initial conception in the
1950s. Indeed, this idea that submarine-based
nuclear weapons are stabilizing now forms one
of the central assumptions of nuclear strategy.
By making nuclear assets harder to find, SSBNs
ensure that even if an incoming counterforce
first strike destroys a state’s land-based weapons,
its sea-based arsenal remains available for coun-
tervalue retaliation. (A counterforce strike
targets an adversary’s nuclear weapons, including
related command-and-control infrastructure. A
countervalue strike is a nuclear strike against a
civilian target, such as a major population
center, and is expected to hold cities hostage by threatening to inflict unacceptable
damage, thus engendering deterrence by punishment.)
But do SSBNs truly provide an unassailable second strike that deters absolutely,
thus generating strategic stability? And does the logic that underpinned sea-based
deterrence during the Cold War apply in South Asia, with political, geographic,
and bureaucratic realities that differ dramatically from those of the U.S.–Soviet
relationship? To answer these questions, this essay seeks first to illuminate the
Cold War context in which these ideas took root and to assess how these ideas
fit into India’s current nuclear doctrine. In the second section, I examine the
South Asian context in which India is operationalizing that doctrine via
Arihant. Here, I address some of the regional implications of the introduction of
sea-based deterrence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), particularly the effect
on India’s relations with China and Pakistan.
I argue that, contrary to prevailing wisdom, sea-based deterrence is unlikely to
contribute significantly to strategic stability in South Asia, nor will it provide
much benefit to India’s overall strategic security. The geostrategic and operational
realities of the South Asian theater differ significantly from those of the ColdWar,
and these differences, combinedwith bureaucratic inertia, resource constraints, and
sharp asymmetries between actors, suggest that the addition of nuclear-armed sub-
marines to the Indian Ocean will likely result in increased crisis instability and fuel
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Back to the Future: Classic Deterrence Theory Revisited
After the detonation of the first thermonuclear device in 1952, and with the
memory of Pearl Harbor still fresh, the central challenge for U.S. nuclear strategists
lay in devising a way to prevent a catastrophic nuclear first strike by the Soviet
Union. The solution, at least in theory, was to develop a secure second-strike capa-
bility that would engender deterrence by punishment.
As long as a preemptive strike could destroy or significantly erode an enemy’s
nuclear force before the enemy could respond, such a first strike could remain
an attractive option for military planners. Strategic stability could thus only be
possible with an assured second-strike capability, which would guarantee that
the first mover could not eliminate the threat of retaliation. The cost of failing
to destroy the adversary’s nuclear arsenal through a counterforce first strike was
too high, the logic went; no rational actor would risk it.
To achieve this second-strike capability, strategic assets either had to be har-
dened so they would be difficult to destroy or they had to be mobile and conceal-
able so they would be difficult to find. Bombers offered mobility, of course, but
getting them in the air before a first strike would require sufficient advanced
warning of incoming missiles—a serious technological challenge at the time.
More promising was the potential for nuclear-armed submarines: in the subsurface
realm, technology favored the defender. In 1959, USS George Washington became
the world’s first operational ballistic missile submarine. By 1988, the Soviet Union
fielded 77 SSBNs, while the United States had 36.5
As the SSBN fleets grew, so did both sides’ anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities, particularly the United States’. But the quantities of submarines
involved provided a measure of assurance; no matter how effective U.S. ASW
was, the United States could never be entirely sure it could find and eliminate
all Soviet SSBNs, particularly as quieting technologies improved. These quantities
also lent credibility to claims of assured retaliation; even if a few boats were to
experience mechanical failures or accidents, there were others still on patrol
and many more prepared to get underway in a crisis. Especially for the Soviets,
quantity obviated some of the quality problems they experienced.
India’s Quest for the Triad
Historically, India’s nuclear posture has rested on three precepts: the policy of no-
first-use (NFU) of nuclear weapons; the goal of credible minimum deterrence; and
the principle of robust civilian control of the nuclear arsenal, in part through the
maintenance of weapons in a disassembled state.6 For India, the nuclear triad is a
logical extension of its NFU principles. Rear Admiral Raja Menon, perhaps India’s
foremost expert on India’s submarine force and its nuclear aspirations, has argued
that only SSBNs offer an “unshakeable second strike” that increases the credibility
India’s Nuclear-Armed Submarines: Deterrence or Danger?
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ▪ FALL 2016 79
of NFU.7 Indeed, India’s 2007 maritime strategy document stated: “Our ‘No First
Use’ policy amply illustrates India’s intentions of using the nuclear deterrent only
as a retaliatory measure of last resort. The sea-based leg of the nuclear triad enables
a survivable second-strike capability and is, therefore, a critical enabler for the
nuclear doctrine of ‘No First Use’ to attain credibility…The nuclear submarine
option is the preferred arsenal for small nuclear forces.”8
Scholars and journalists have advanced additional explanations for India’s
pursuit of a sea-based deterrent, ranging from a desire for prestige to bureaucratic-
organizational rationales. There is certainly a prestige element in the hype surround-
ing Arihant, both national and naval. In its first published maritime doctrine,
released in 2004, the Indian Navy had lamented its marginalization from India’s
strategic program, stating, “India stands out alone as being devoid of a credible
nuclear triad.”9 AtArihant’s July 26, 2009 launch, then-PrimeMinisterManmohan
Singh stated, “Todaywe join a select group of five nationswho possess the capability
to build a nuclear-powered submarine”—the five permanentmembers of theUnited
Nations Security Council—and said that it was a “special achievement.”10
Others have suggested that the development of India’s first SSBN was more
accidental than intentional. In “The Imagined Arsenal: India’s Nuclear
Decision-Making, 1973–76,” Yogesh Joshi questions the belief prevalent among
Indian strategists that the purpose of India’s nuclear submarine program was deter-
rence-driven. The historical evidence suggests instead that “the entire focus of the
nuclear submarine program was initially set on producing a viable ‘compact
nuclear reactor,’ rather than designing the submarine in which it would be ulti-
mately installed.”11 In a lecture at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in
2014, Vice Admiral Vijay Shankar suggested that the original goal of the
program was a nuclear-powered—but conventionally armed—attack submarine
(SSN), rather than an SSBN.12 These varied accounts suggest that the SSBN
program may be only loosely tied to India’s strategic goals.
Officially, however, the strategic logic underpinning India’s SSBN program
extends directly from the 1950s Cold War logic laid out earlier in this essay.
India’s current maritime strategy document, Enduring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime
Security Strategy, released in October 2015, explicitly references the Cold War in
its explanation for India’s pursuit of a nuclear triad: “Cold War experience has
shown that reduction in the first-strike and increase in the second-strike (retalia-
tory) component considerably stabilises [sic] and strengthens deterrence.”13
Regional Trends and Implications
While India views its pursuit of a sea-based nuclear deterrent as supporting its
NFU policy, there are serious repercussions for relations with its regional
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rivals. India’s SSBN force may have serious effects on China and on Pakistan,
including potentially jeopardizing both arms race stability and crisis stability.
While it is unlikely that Arihant will induce major changes in China’s
naval or nuclear policies, it is also unlikely to achieve any of India’s strategic
aims vis-à-vis China. With Pakistan, however,
Arihant and her sisters may generate a new vector
for crisis instability. Furthermore, India’s SSBN
acquisition increases the pressure Pakistan feels to
acquire its own triad, as well as driving Pakistan’s
desire for additional conventional naval
capabilities.14
If Cold War-era deterrence theory holds true, we
should expect India’s SSBNs to prove stabilizing to
its adversarial relationships with China and Pakistan,
with two stipulations. First, in order to avoid undermining the NFU pledge, the
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on board must be imprecise
enough that they are appropriate only for a countervalue strike and not for a coun-
terforce strike. At this time, the K-4 and shorter-range K-15 likely meet this
requirement.15 Second, the SSBN delivery system must be credible and safe in
order to provide the assured second strike. If the second strike cannot be
assured, the logic of the triad unravels.
This could be a good-news story for the region if the introduction of sea-
based deterrence slows the conventional and strategic arms races occurring
between India and Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, between India and
China. If first-use incentives cease to exist, states should be less inclined to
arms race, as strategic stability has been achieved and therefore there is no
theoretical military utility to be gained by introducing additional nuclear
weapons or systems.
The development of robust SSBN fleets did not seem to generate a sense of
security on either side of the Cold War, however. Even as the superpowers
pursued—and achieved—credible, assured, secure second-strike capabilities,
they continued to develop new land- and air-based delivery systems, more
advanced missiles, and better warheads. SSBNs did not prevent the United
States or the Soviet Union from adopting expansive target sets and building
several thousand nuclear warheads; at their peak, some estimates suggest the
United States had over 23,000 devices, while the Soviets had 45,000. (To be
sure, decisions regarding intra-country horizontal and vertical proliferation are
not strictly rational. Outside influences such as bureaucratic politics, national pres-
tige, and path dependence often conspire to generate upward pressure on arsenal
size and diversity. Nevertheless, the notion that SSBNs preclude further nuclear
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There is evidence to suggest, however, that
SSBNs can generate demands for larger arsenals
of conventional ASW assets, offering an
additional vector for regional crisis instability.
When the Soviet Union introduced the Delta-I
class of SSBNs, which carried new long-range
ballistic missiles that could threaten the U.S.
homeland from Soviet waters, the U.S. demand
for SSNs for ASW purposes spiked dramatically.
Before the Deltas were introduced, the U.S.
could detect Soviet submarines crossing the so-called Greenland–Iceland–United
Kingdom (GIUK) gap, and could target them as they exited into the Atlantic
Ocean. The Deltas, however, did not have to go beyond the range of Soviet air
defense batteries; to hold them at risk would require a different ASW posture.17
While in an ideal world, adversaries would accept mutual vulnerability and
decline to pursue one another’s second-strike assets, the reality is that states
seem unwilling to forgo ASW when faced with a potentially existential threat
for which there might be a military solution. India is likely to experience just
such a situation as Pakistan and China build up their attack submarine fleets.18
The need to conduct intelligence gathering on acoustic signatures and operating
patterns of new adversary submarines and to defend against incursions into terri-
torial waters also drives demand for conventional assets.19 Indeed, India is devel-
oping a new class of nuclear attack submarines, and is in talks with Russia
regarding the lease of a second SSN.20
There is also the opportunity cost associated
with a conventional submarine arms race.
Outside of their ISR functions, attack submar-
ines are primarily useful for blockades and high-
end warfighting; they have little utility for
counter-piracy operations or humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HADR), which
have been a significant part of the South
Asian navies’ mission sets in recent years. By
purchasing more submarines, states may shift resources away from these traditional
roles and thus have fewer assets available that allow for gradations of force.
An Indian SSBN also opens up questions about potential changes to India’s
command and control procedures and preferences. Indian civilian leaders have
historically been loath to give control of assembled nuclear weapons to the
Indian armed forces, leading to the (perhaps now erroneous) belief that India’s
nuclear weapons are maintained in a “disassembled and dispersed configuration.”21
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Organisation (DRDO) maintains the nuclear warheads, while the delivery systems
belong to the armed forces. This is obviously an unlikely configuration for a sea-
based deterrent, and may reflect a shift in Indian attitudes toward assertive civilian
control. Such a shift would be particularly troubling for Pakistan, which has come
to expect that the Indian civilian government will keep the Indian military in
check during crises.
Two related command and control issues are the “always-never dilemma” and
the problem of maintaining communications with deployed submarines. The
“always-never dilemma” refers to the challenge of ensuring that nuclear
weapons are always ready for use but can never be launched accidentally or
without the proper authorization. In the context of ballistic missile submarines,
the problem of unauthorized launch becomes a technological question as much
as a personnel surety issue. For submarines, constant communication may be
undesirable, as many forms of communication make the submarine more likely
to be detected. In the event of a crisis, the destruction of C2 nodes such as
very-low frequency (VLF) or extremely-low frequency (ELF) stations could
prevent SSBNs on patrol from receiving instructions.22 In the event of connec-
tivity failure, the question of pre-delegation arises: if the political leadership
cannot be reached, how should the forces respond? Who, if anybody, has
launch authority?23
Look East: The Challenges Posed by China
India’s initial decision to acquire nuclear weapons was driven in large part by its
relations with China.24 Since the disastrous 1962 Sino–Indian war, concerns
about Chinese intentions and capabilities have undergirded Indian strategic
thinking. The Sino–Indian border issues in Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai Chin
have not yet been resolved, which leaves India uneasy and gives China the
upper hand in bilateral negotiations, as it knows India would strongly prefer a com-
promise to a confrontation.25 As China continues to grow economically and mili-
tarily, India finds itself in the uncomfortable position of trying to ward off potential
Chinese aggression while not provoking China into an arms race.
Complicating this balancing act is India’s close trade relationship with China.
These trade ties could offer a potential source of stability and cooperation in the
future, but there is no guarantee that this process will not reverse itself. While
China and India have good reasons to maintain their trade relationships now,
they may find themselves in competition for the resources necessary for economic
growth, particularly energy. In order to continue their rapid growth, India and
China require secure access to oil. The volume of trade that passes through the
Indian Ocean is staggering: roughly two-thirds of the world’s petroleum products
transit this space, along with 50 percent of the world’s container traffic.26
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It is in the context of resource access and regional influence that China has been a
significant factor in India’s naval acquisition and modernization efforts. As China’s
maritime ambitions have grownand its navy has expanded, India has become increas-
ingly concerned about what it perceives as a serious and growing threat to India’s
interests throughout the IOR. In 2009, former Chief of the Indian Navy Admiral
Arun Prakash declared, “It is time for India to shed her blinkers and prepare to
counter PLA Navy’s impending power-play in the Indian Ocean.”27
China’s increasing engagement with IOR states has India drawing redlines
“with the goal of deterring Beijing from actions that infringe unacceptably on
Indian interests as India interprets them.”28 Among these redlines, scholars
James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara identify three potential naval triggers of
Sino–Indian hostilities: forward deployment of Chinese nuclear submarines to
the Indian Ocean; the development of a network of Chinese naval facilities
across the IOR; or a Chinese effort to keep India out of the South China Sea.
While it seems unlikely that any of these developments would lead directly to
war absent other drivers, there is a great deal of consternation among Indian nav-
alists about the threats posed by Chinese submarines. In 2013, for example, an
Indian defense ministry report indicated that China had been sending attack sub-
marines into the Indian Ocean with an “‘implicit focus’ [on] undermining the
Indian Navy’s [ability] ‘to control highly-sensi-
tive sea lines of communication.’”29
Indian officials and scholars have indicated
that India’s pursuit of a sea-based deterrent is
intended to deter China, but they have been
less clear about precisely which Chinese
actions or ambitions India’s SSBNs could
potentially deter. There is a disconcerting
lack of conceptual clarity among Indian state-
ments about the linkages—or lack thereof—
between increased Chinese naval activity in the IOR and the functions an
Indian SSBN could perform. There is no causal mechanism by which an oper-
ational SSBN fleet could prevent China’s naval expansion into the IOR along
the lines Holmes and Yoshihara provide; it is simply not credible to expect
India will conduct a first strike, thereby abandoning its NFU doctrine and inviting
Chinese retaliation, simply because China forward deployed a handful of submar-
ines in India’s backyard.
What of deterring nuclear annihilation? While India may worry in the abstract
about a Chinese first strike, there are few plausible scenarios in which China is
likely to see itself as deriving benefits from a massive counterforce first strike
against India. Even granting such a possibility, an Indian SSBN provides only a
marginal additional deterrent value against China. Whether China would risk
There are few
plausible scenarios
for China to see
beneﬁts from a ﬁrst
strike against India.
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Indian retaliation may depend on the future configuration of the K-4 missiles, how
reliable China considers them to be, and how confident China is in its ASW abil-
ities beyond the South China Sea.
With this in mind, the introduction of nuclear weapons at sea could be read as a
positive development. China has an operational sea-based second-strike capability
vis-à-vis India; if India can achieve mutual vulnerability with China via an SSBN
fleet, it could be less inclined to pursue a larger land-based nuclear arsenal.
However, India’s 2007 maritime strategy belies the notion that the state will
content itself with mutual vulnerability: “The increased presence of submarines
in India’s areas of interest, with weapons capable of striking military and strategic
targets at standoff ranges, necessitates development of our sub-surface surveillance
systems. These include both mobile and static systems, for use onboard ships, sub-
marines, aircraft, and in vantage positions at sea.”30
On the positive side, an Indian SSBN fleet is unlikely to change China’s
nuclear force posture. As noted, estimates vary, but the total figure for the
Arihant-class fleet is thought to be in the range of five to six boats. As Andrew
Winner, a professor of strategic studies focused on South Asian security, notes,
“China has lived with the vastly more substantial submarine presence embodied
by the U.S. Navy for many years. It will understandably regard the seagoing
Indian deterrent as a lesser included case for peacetime strategy.”31
While China may not view India’s SSBN as an immediate threat that requires
significant force structure changes, China is likely to increase its surveillance
efforts in the IOR so as to collect data about Indian SSBN operational patterns
and acoustic signatures, with submarines being an obvious choice of ISR plat-
form—exactly the sort of behavior India hopes to quash. As China improves its
ASW capabilities and its ability to monitor the IOR from the various naval
bases and ports it has helped build, India’s patrolling SSBN will become less
secure. This is likely to take several years, but if China’s ASW abilities outpace
India’s shipbuilding and quieting abilities, the trend line points toward a less
secure system—and thus a less assured second strike.
Look West: The Enduring Problem of Pakistan
After a series of wars and countless border skirmishes over the last 60 years, the
India–Pakistan conflict remains unresolved and remarkably volatile. Pakistan’s
disadvantage against India in its conventional military capabilities has endured,
and the conventional gap between the rivals is only growing as India invests
heavily in new, more advanced weapons systems. India has also developed what
is colloquially known as the Cold Start doctrine, which calls for a rapid but
shallow incursion into Pakistan to deter Pakistan from supporting non-state
actors. As Pakistan’s ability to deter India conventionally has withered, it has
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developed short-range, low-yield nuclear weapons that could be used against an
Indian offensive column that crossed the international border in a Cold Start-
style attack.32 The cold peace that endures between these nuclear-armed adver-
saries is fragile at best; another terrorist attack like the 2008 Mumbai siege
could spark a war.33
Could an assured second strike stabilize the
India–Pakistan dyad? It seems unlikely; the
main threat India faces from Pakistan is
violent non-state actors, while Pakistan’s over-
riding fear is a conventional conflict that threa-
tens Pakistan’s survival. Neither of these
concerns is necessarily obviated by India’s pos-
session of SLBMs. The myriad non-state actors
in South Asia are unlikely to change in
response to the addition of sea-based nuclear weapons, and neither India nor Paki-
stan has the capacity to eliminate the threat they pose even before considering the
added burden associated with modernizing and expanding the submarine
services.34
Should Pakistan acquire a triad in pursuit of parity with India, it is possible Paki-
stan could feel more secure about the survivability of its deterrent and thus its exis-
tential security. Given Pakistan’s conventional weakness and its adoption of an
asymmetric escalation strategy that relies on the threat of first use, however, it is
more likely that Pakistan would simply add sea-based weapons to its arsenal
while continuing its development of new delivery systems, both shorter- and
longer-range missiles, and more warheads. Sea-based weapons do not resolve the
credibility problem surrounding Pakistan’s threat of early first use of nuclear
weapons against Indian cross-border operations.
In reality, mutual vulnerability already exists in South Asia. Both India and
Pakistan would be hard-pressed to eliminate their opponent’s entire arsenal in a
first strike; their ISR and targeting capabilities are simply not up to the task.
Thus, both states already face the possibility of a countervalue second strike.
Basing nuclear weapons at sea would contribute only marginally to the goal of
arsenal survivability, especially if the submarines carrying them are noisy and
easily found.
Furthermore, the deployment of Pakistani nuclear warheads aboard an Agosta
submarine, the most commonly proposed configuration for a Pakistani sea-based
deterrent, introduces the specter of inadvertent escalation. In a crisis, Indian
ASW would not be able to tell conventionally-armed Agosta 90Bs from those car-
rying nuclear warheads, and could unintentionally strike a nuclear-armed boat.
Given the history of mistrust, Pakistan may believe such an incident to be an
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conventional arms race front, Pakistan has also indicated its interest in better
ASW, both via new attack submarines and additional air assets. In April 2015,
Pakistan concluded negotiations begun in 2011 with China over the purchase
of six air independent propulsion (AIP)-equipped Yuan-class submarines.35 AIP
technology helps mitigate one of the biggest weakness of SSKs, the need to
surface frequently to access atmospheric oxygen, thus providing these submarines
the ability to stay submerged for longer periods of time.
Unintended Consequences
According to Rear Admiral Raja Menon, “nuclear subs earn their keep every day
of the year. Ballistic missile submarines save nations on that one fateful day, when
the enemy’s political leaders look at our SLBMs and stay their hand on the
button.”36 While an operational sea-based deterrent should hypothetically
provide India with a greater sense of existential security vis-à-vis China, it is unli-
kely to cause India to abandon its pursuit of additional nuclear capabilities,
suggesting that the introduction of an Indian SSBN does not offer the solution
to India’s perceived security threats from China. An Indian sea-based deterrent
does, however, exacerbate arms racing tendencies in Pakistan, even as its induc-
tion poses substantial challenges for the Indian political and naval establishments.
Furthermore, while an Indian SSBN fleet could provide stability at the strategic or
nuclear level under certain conditions, it is also likely to generate conventional
maritime arms races in both dyads.
The growth of conventional naval arsenals could have potentially deleterious
effects on crisis stability, particularly if they come into contact with strategic
systems. It is here that the dangers of India’s pursuit of a sea-based deterrent are
most pronounced. There are numerous risks inherent in sea-based nuclear arms,
ranging from nuclear accidents to theft of fissile materials to crises that escalate
to war. The degradation of command and control is especially problematic for sub-
marines: who retains launch authority if a submarine loses contact with the
national command authority? India has a strong tradition of civilian control of
the nuclear arsenal, and Indian nuclear weapons have traditionally been under-
stood to be kept de-mated and not available for immediate use. An SSBN,
however, must carry both warheads and missiles. Some level of pre-delegation
cannot be avoided if the system is to be effective, but this introduces new oppor-
tunities for the misuse of weapons. India has not yet explained how it intends to
retain active civilian control over its SLBM arsenal.
In the event of a crisis, fear of a bolt-from-the-blue countervalue first strike
could incentivize India’s adversaries to target the Indian SSBN. This could
create “use it or lose it” pressures for India: either India uses the warheads
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aboard the SSBN or it risks losing them to enemy ASW. Indeed, if these states are
unwilling to accept a position of mutual vulnerability, the introduction of an
SSBN capability will generate demand for improved attack submarine fleets,
either to protect the SSBNs or for ASW, in India, Pakistan, and China alike.
There are numerous pathways by which submarines could be used provocatively
without necessarily triggering an open conflict. Currently, there is little dialogue
between India and Pakistan or China about how each side perceives naval, par-
ticularly subsurface, actions and how these states might mitigate worst-case think-
ing that could cause crises at sea to spiral. As the quantity and quality of
submarines in the IOR—particularly those capable of carrying nuclear weapons
or of tracking and killing other submarines—increases, there is a slim but
growing danger of accidental or inadvertent escalation in both dyads. While
SSBNs may offer some added stability at the strategic or nuclear level, they may
exacerbate conventional maritime arms races that could lead to crises with stra-
tegic effects.
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